This evolutionary process culminated in 2015, as the SCC released its decision in SFL which defined the three key components of the freedom of association in the labour context: 1) the right to organize and choose a bargaining agent; 2) the right to bargain and the extent of government restrictions on the scope of bargaining; and 3) the right to strike. With the SFL decision, the SCC finally reversed the 1987 Labour Trilogy and fully endorsed a purposive interpretation of the Charter.
Some SCC decisions in the first years of the Charter by lower courts recognized that workers enjoyed significant substantive rights, including the right to strike and the right to collectively bargain protected by the freedom of association. However, when those initial cases made it to 4 Canada's highest court by 1987, it was evident that the SCC at that time did not share the same expansive view of the freedom of association.
The Court has rooted labour rights in section 2 of the Charter, notably ss. At the heart of the 1987 Labour Trilogy was whether the freedom of association protected the right to strike and collective bargaining. In reviewing the scope of the freedom of association, a majority of the SCC examined freedom of association from a broad, decontextualized perspective, not a labour specific perspective. The main reasons were delivered in the Alberta Reference, a case challenging legislation which provided for different forms of arbitration at the discretion of government to resolve impasses in collective bargaining and a prohibition on strikes for workers providing essential services. The SCC firmly rejected the idea that either strike activity or collective bargaining were protected by the freedom of association under the Charter.
In Alberta Reference, the status of trade unions was not challenged, but their core activities, the ability to collectively bargain and strike, were contested. The majority of the SCC articulated a bright line test for claims under the freedom of association: the formation of the association was protected but not the activities of the association.
However, in Alberta Reference Dickson, CJ offered a compelling and principled dissent which advocated the recognition and protection of collective bargaining and the right to strike. There are several important elements in the dissent which the SCC would pick up in later cases. Dickson canvassed a wide array of sources of law, including Canadian, Commonwealth, United States, and
International law to come to the conclusion that the freedom of association under the Charter must protect the right to collectively bargain and the right to strike. The most significant aspect of the Dickson Dissent was the purposive approach to Charter interpretation, in which he rejected the majority's narrow approach.
The essentially formal nature of a constitutive approach to freedom of association is equally apparent when one considers other types of associational activity in our society. ... If freedom of association only protects the joining together of persons for common purposes, but not the pursuit of the very activities for which the association was formed, then the freedom is indeed legalistic, ungenerous, indeed vapid.
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Dickson explored the purpose and meaning of strike activity and found it was qualitatively different than individual activity, such as quitting, because of its associational aspect. A collective refusal to work to improve working conditions is fundamentally different than an individual refusal to continue to work. There is both an action directed at an employer, and a coming together of individuals which unites a collective. At interest in the freedom of association is association for a purpose: the balancing of power between individuals and larger entities, such as the state or an employer.
Dickson also recognized the dignity interest in workers having a meaningful say over their working conditions.
Significantly, Dickson also looked to international law norms, which he observed were relevant and persuasive, to find as a general principle from the International Labour Organization "that freedom to form and organize unions, even in the public sector, must include freedom to pursue the essential activities of unions, such as collective bargaining and strikes, subject to reasonable limits." The Dickson Dissent set out the following principles of international law relevant to Charter interpretation:
C there is a body of treaties, conventions and customary norms that comprise international human rights law and reflect the commitment of the nations of the world to ensure "freedom, dignity and social justice" for their citizens; C Canada has "obliged itself internationally to ensure within its borders the protection of certain fundamental rights and freedoms which are also contained in the Charter"; and C "the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified".
Although not adopted at the time, the reasons in the Dickson Dissent would serve to ground a principled interpretation of the Charter recognizing fundamental labour rights in 2007 and 2015.
In the 1990s, the SCC confirmed the majority decision in the Alberta Reference that the freedom of association protects 1) the freedom to establish an association; 2) the exercise in association the constitutional rights of individuals; and 3) the exercise in association of lawful rights of individuals.
In 2001, the SCC considered s. 2(d) in the exclusion of agricultural workers in Ontario from the Labour Relations Act. The SCC concluded that agricultural workers were unable to exercise their 9 freedom to associate in the absence of a statutory mechanism which provided the ability to organize and requirements for employers to recognize the employee groups and bargain in good faith. In coming to this conclusion, the majority accepted that the government may need to act positively in rare cases for individual to actualize fundamental freedoms.
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001 ] 3 SCR 1016 , 2001 Farm workers are a disadvantaged group and one can understand why the SCC was more willing to recognize infringement of the freedom of association in the case of these precarious workers. In
Dunmore, given the substantial interference to the ability of farm workers to organize posed by their exclusion from a statutory labour relations regime, the Court found that exclusion unconstitutional.
The 1987 the SCC had failed to adopt a contextual approach to the interpretation of s. 2(d) and therefore valued the associational aspect of collective bargaining as a merely a constitutive right.
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The SCC, in an exceptional move, reversed its earlier jurisprudence and extended the scope of the guarantee of freedom of association to include protection of the right to engage in collective bargaining on fundamental workplace issues and a concomitant obligation on employers to bargain in good faith.
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Convergence with international law
The contextual approach utilized by the SCC in Health Services considered labour history, Charter jurisprudence, and importantly, international law which the SCC had turned to tentatively in
Dunmore.
Our conclusion that s. International law plays a significant role in interpreting the meaning of freedom of association in constitutional law in multiple state jurisdictions. International law is in fact an underlying source in the development of a common understanding of the meaning of freedom of association in domestic constitutional law around the world. In Health Services, the SCC was both adopting and contributing to this recognition.
The use of international law in the SCC's interpretation of the Charter also reflects the linkage between those international obligations and the provisions of the Charter.
It is a matter of historical record that the drafters of the Charter looked to Canada's international treaty obligations, especially the ICCPR, for inspiration and guidance. The results may be seen on the face of the Charter itself; many of its provisions correspond closely to provisions of the UDHR, ICCPR and ECtHR. The ECHR only has jurisdiction to determine violations of the European Convention, although it can consider other international instruments to inform its decisions. Article 11 of the European Convention provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State. 
Post Health Services
Following the landmark decision in Health Services, a number of legal challenges were launched or pursued across Canada based on the finding that collective bargaining was protected associational activity. The lower courts had a difficult time consistently applying and interpreting Health Services The primary objects of the LRA [Labour Relations Act] include giving effect to and regulating the fundamental labour rights conferred by the labour rights clause of the Constitution, and giving effect to obligations incurred by South Africa as a member state of the ILO…The interpretation of the LRA must give effect to its primary objects and be in compliance with the Constitution and t he public international law obligations of the Republic.
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The role of international law arising from a review of the freedom of association and the specific right to strike from in ILO cases is either to strengthen a decision based on domestic law" or " as a RMT the ECHR found that the strike notice requirements do not violate the Convention and that
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while restrictions on secondary striking in the United Kingdom conflict with freedoms recognized at international law, this interference is justified due to the policy objectives of the Government and the nature of the interest at stake.
While the actions were regulated by domestic law, RMT sought to have those provisions of the TULRA which restricted strike action reviewed by the ECHR. The state parties to the European Convention, including the U.K., undertake to secure those rights and freedoms within their jurisdiction, and the ECHR adjudicates the state parties' Convention obligations. The parties to a case before the ECHR must abide by the judgments of the Court and take all necessary measures to comply, including remedying complainants and amending legislation. In that sense the Convention acts as a constitutional document that may override contrary domestic state legislation.
The ES Charter does recognize the right of workers to strike and the European Committee of Social
Rights [ECSR] found that the balloting requirements of the United Kingdom in other cases are "excessive" and that the restrictions on secondary action make the ability of workers to take collective action "excessively circumscribed." Likewise, the EU Charter protects the right of workers "to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action". These three sources informed the ECHR's interpretation of the Convention as sources of comparative law, in addition to domestic laws of other European nations.
In doing so, the ECHR found that the ability of a union to take strike action in support of its members at another employer was trade union activity, consistent with Convention 87, the EU Charter, and the ES Charter. The interference with the secondary strike activity in RMT breached Article 11(1) of the Convention and the ECHR then turned to consider justification for interference.
In finding a right to collective bargaining and then the right to strike in Article 11 in Demir and Baykara and then later in RMT; the ECHR noted its reliance on Convention 87 and other United Nations instruments such as the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Declaration of Fundamental Principles
The Rail, Maritime, and Transport Workers v. U.K. 1045/10 -Chamber Judgment [2014] 26 ECHR 366 (08 April 2014) [RMT] and Rights at Work (1998). The ECHR turned to these sources of international law in expanding the meaning of the freedom of association to include the right to strike. 
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The SCC expressly adopted the Dickson Dissent and the purposive approach to freedom of association. Although arising out of a workplace dynamic, the Court was careful to state the purpose of the freedom of association in broader terms: to rectify social imbalance.
This then is a fundamental purpose of s. 2(d) -to protect the individual from "state-enforced isolation in the pursuit of his or her ends": Alberta Reference, at p. Prophetically, the SCC in an appeal of the trial judge decision, did take that step in SFL and overturned the 1987 Labour Trilogy in a 5-2 majority decision. The SCC largely endorsed the trial judge's reasons, looking at a purposive and contextual approach, labour history, and international law and provided a simplified test for infringement, based on Mounted Police.
The SCC found that the right to strike was a necessary component of collective bargaining, not a free standing right, and followed the reasoning in the Dickson Dissent:
The right to strike is not merely derivative of collective bargaining, it is an indispensable component of that right. It seems to me to be the time to give this conclusion constitutional benediction.
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The SCC then provided a simplified, relative to Health Services, test for looking at infringement of the freedom of association.
The test, then, is whether the legislative interference with the right to strike in a particular case amounts to a substantial interference with collective bargaining. Relying on the international law developments, and on labour history and labour relations realities and domestic Charter values, the SCC concluded that the right to strike was protected under the
Charter.
This historical, international, and jurisprudential landscape suggests compellingly to me that s. 2 (d) has arrived at the destination sought by Dickson C.J. in the Alberta Reference, namely, the conclusion that a meaningful process of collective bargaining requires the ability of employees to participate in the collective withdrawal of services for the purpose of pursuing the terms and conditions of their employment through a collective agreement. Where good faith negotiations break down, the ability to engage in the collective withdrawal of services is a necessary component of the process through which workers can continue to participate meaningfully in the pursuit of their collective workplace goals. In this case, the suppression of the right to strike amounts to a substantial interference with the right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining. 
